

ment, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter, as certain to reduce perceptibly the health and spirits of the men, and even to relax the bands of discipline, and to render the army in every way less efficient.¹ It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned "the trade of the soldier,"—should have acquired familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend largely superior numbers, better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army.

Such in fact was the view of the situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the lately victorious army at Manassas Junction,² Joseph E. Johnston. In his opinion, his two corps commanders, Beauregard, whose original command was now designated as the First Corps of the Confederate army,³ and Gr. W. Smith, who had just been assigned to the command of the troops which

Johnston
brought over from the Shenandoah
Valley to fight
the battle of Manassas, and which now
constituted
the Second Corps of that army,⁴ entirely
concurrent.

⁵ W. R., 885, 886.

⁸ Afterwards called the Army of Northern Virginia.

* Afterwards commanded by Longstreet.

⁴ Afterwards commanded by Stonewall Jackson.